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INTRODUCTION
Of the many current issues facing state and local governments,
perhaps one of the most pressing is public pension reform. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, there are nearly 4,000 public pension systems in the
United States, the vast majority (3,742) of which are administered by local
governments.' As of 2014, these systems had more than 19,000,000
members and more than 9,000,000 beneficiaries receiving periodic
2
payments. But many of these systems are in serious financial trouble,
collectively facing unfunded liabilities that, by some estimates, equal
approximately $4.7 trillion.3 In light of these shortfalls, many states have
enacted a variety of reform measures to stave off fiscal collapse, and these
reforms have drawn numerous legal challenges from public sector
employees and retirees.
One of the challenges often asserted by these plaintiffs is that
changes to public pension plans violate the Takings Clause of the federal
constitution or one of its state constitutional counterparts. Despite the
frequency with which they are raised, however, these claims seldom receive
engaged analysis by the courts, and they have been given a sort of second-
class treatment by most legal scholars. On one level, this treatment is not all
that surprising. Because most public pension plans are deemed to create
contract rights in their participants, the Contracts Clause seems the more
obvious provision under which to analyze pension plan changes. As a
result, takings challenges are often overshadowed by challenges brought
under the Contracts Clause, with many courts and commentators viewing
them as largely duplicative. Additionally, even when takings challenges are
treated independently, the number of troublesome issues and the general
messiness of takings doctrine make meaningful analysis difficult.
Even so, I contend that the short shrift given to the Takings Clause
in this context is unwarranted. As an initial matter, the notion that public
pension plans create contracts between government employers and
employees is not universally accepted. A handful of states explicitly reject
1. Phillip Vidal, Annual Survey ofPublic Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered
Defined Benefit Data Summary Report: 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, July 2015, at 5,
available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/econ/g14-
aspp-sl.pdf.
2. Id. at 3.
3. See Joe Luppino-Esposito, Promises Made, Promises Broken 2014: Unfunded
Liabilities Hit $4.7 Trillion, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.alec.org/article/promises-made-promises-broken-20 14-unfunded-liabilities-hit-
4-7-trillion/.
4. These reform measures have included increasing employee contributions, reducing
cost of living adjustments, changing age and service requirements, adjusting the way in
which benefits are calculated, and converting from defined benefit plans to some type of
alternative. See T. Leigh Anenson et al., Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 12 (2014) (listing recent reform measures); Stuart Buck, The Legal Ramifications of
Public Pension Reform, 17 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 25, 49 (2012) (same).
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that approach, holding instead that such plans create property interests. In
these "property states," the Contracts Clause clearly provides no protection
against plan changes but the Takings Clause might. Far from being
duplicative, in these jurisdictions, takings claims form the most viable
constitutional challenge to reform.
But the Takings Clause has significance even in the majority of
states that accept the contract view. As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the Contracts Clause would only prohibit impairments to those plans that
were not "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."'
No such justification attends a Takings Clause analysis, however, which
focuses on the effects of a regulation rather than its purposes. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that a focus on the government's purpose or motive
"has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." 6 As such, it is possible
that a law might be upheld under the Contracts Clause but nevertheless
amount to an unconstitutional taking. Again, rather than merely duplicating
the Contracts Clause, in the right case, a takings challenge could achieve an
entirely different result. And, given that fact, it is all the more important to
consider the issues that a takings claim would raise.
This Article seeks to fill the gap left open by previous judicial and
scholarly treatment and begin a more robust conversation about the role of
the Takings Clause in public pension reform litigation. In service of that
larger objective, this Article has two primary goals. The first, advanced in
Parts I and II, is to make the case for taking the Takings Clause seriously in
this context. Because a takings claim depends upon the existence of a
cognizable property right, Part I addresses the legal status of public pension
benefits. Although a small number of states view such benefits as gratuities,
most states regard them as creating either contract or property rights in plan
participants. As such, public pension benefits are subject to certain
constitutional protections-namely, those afforded by the Contracts Clause,
the Due Process Clause, or the Takings Clause. Part II addresses the
particular significance of the Takings Clause, distinguishing it from the
other two provisions and demonstrating its potential value for plan
participants under both the "property view" and the "contract view" of
public pensions.
The second goal, more modest but equally important, is to consider
(although not necessarily resolve) some of the legal issues that any serious
evaluation of a takings claim must confront. Part III begins this
consideration, focusing on how courts might go about determining whether
a particular reform measure effects a taking of property in the first instance.
This task requires fitting challenges to public pension reform within the
Supreme Court's analytical framework for regulatory takings, which in turn
necessitates a choice about the appropriate test to apply. Assuming that a
5. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
6. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
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reform measure is deemed to effect a taking, Part IV turns to the
constitutional requirements of "public use" and "just compensation," with
particular emphasis on the thorny questions raised by the latter.
I. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS UNDER STATE LAW
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 7 Most state constitutions contain similar constraints on the
government's taking authority.8 Because the Takings Clause protects
"private property," a threshold issue in any takings case is whether the
claimant has a protectable property interest at the time the taking is alleged
to have occurred.9 The Supreme Court has indicated that, in most cases, that
issue will be governed by the laws of the various states.' 0 To appreciate the
significance of a takings challenge to public pension reform efforts,
therefore, it is first necessary to understand the status of public pension
benefits under state law.
A. Gratuity View
The traditional view adhered to by most states until the mid-
twentieth century was that public pensions amounted to a mere gratuity."
Under this view, pension benefits given to public employees were
considered to be "a bounty springing from the appreciation and
graciousness of the sovereign," and as such, could be "modified, revised,
amended, superseded, or repealed by the Legislature" at its discretion.12
Where this view of public pensions holds, neither takings protections nor
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Nollanv. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Chi., B.
& Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1897).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (" [P]rivate property shall not be taken for, or
applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor."); Wis. CONST. art. I,
§ 13 ("The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation
therefor."). A notable exception is the North Carolina Constitution, which contains no
explicit takings protections. See Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54, 68 (N.C. 1998) (noting the
absence of express constitutional takings provision). Even so, the North Carolina courts have
recognized the basic protections of the Takings Clause to form part of the fundamental law
of the state. Id.
9. See, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2004); see also L.C. Canyon Partners v. Salt Lake Cnty., 266 P.3d 797, 805 (Utah 2011)
(employing similar analysis under state constitution).
10. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560
U.S. 702, 707 (2010) (plurality); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
11. See Buck, supra note 4, at 49-50; Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform:
The Legal Framework, 5 EDUc. FIN. &POL'Y 617, 619 (2010).
12. Bloughv. Ekstrom, 144 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957).
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other constitutional constraints limit the government's ability to reform its
retirement system.13
Today, only three states-Arkansas, Indiana, and Texas-continue
to adhere to the gratuity approach, and even those states do not apply that
approach with full force. The courts in Arkansas and Indiana make a
distinction between voluntary and involuntary pension plans, and they
follow the gratuity view only with regard to those plans in which the
employee had no choice but to participate. Voluntary plans, by contrast,
have been held to create contracts in both states, and the courts have
protected certain aspects of those contracts against subsequent changes. 5 In
Texas, all public pension plans continue to be governed by the gratuity
approach,1 6 but the state appears to have applied its power sparingly with
regard to recent reform measures.' 7 The result is that most states, even those
that continue formally to adhere to the traditional gratuity view, treat public
pension plans as creating some form of protectable right or interest in at
least some circumstances. 8
B. Contract View
The majority of states have moved away from the gratuity approach
by protecting plan participants under principles of contract law. Although
most jurisdictions apply some type of contract view to their public
retirement systems, wide variety exists in the details. The primary
differences concern how the contract is created, when the contract becomes
effective, and what terms the contract includes.
A number of states specifically identify their pension plans as
contractual relationships via constitutional or statutory pronouncement.19 In
13. See Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that governments operating
under gratuity approach "may be constrained by moral and policy concerns, but not the
law").
14. See Robinson v. Taylor, 29 S.W.3d 691, 693-94 (Ark. 2000) (holding that plan
funded entirely by employer without any voluntary contributions from employee was
gratuity); Ballardv. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ind. 1975)
(distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary plans).
15. See, e.g., Jones v. Cheney, 489 S.W.2d 785, 788-89 (Ark. 1973); Bd. of Trs. of
Pub. Emps.' Ret. Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 208-09 (Ind. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Tex.
2015).
17. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 620 n.4 (noting that recent changes to state
pension plan applied to new hires only, leaving benefits for current employees untouched).
18. Aside from policy concerns about leaving public employees wholly unprotected,
state constitutional provisions prohibiting the gifting of public funds also counsel against the
gratuity approach. See id. at 619-20 (citing Yeazellv. Coplin, 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1965)).
19. Seven states provide for contract rights in their constitutions. See ALASKA CONST.
art. XII, § 7; ARIz. CONST. art XXIX, § 1(C); HAW. CONST. art XVI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art.
XII, § 5; LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(A) & (B); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24; N.Y. CONST. art. V,
§ 7. At least three states explicitly provide such rights by statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 121.011(3)(d); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 25(5); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:13-22.33.
2017]
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most states, however, courts have inferred the existence of a contract (or
similar relationship) based on the statutory language creating a pension
plan, promises and representations made to plan participants, employees'
reasonable expectations and reliance interests, or other relevant facts and
circumstances. 20 Although the reasoning of these decisions is by no means
uniform, a leading rationale for the contract view is that pension plans
create a unilateral contract whereby the government offers retirement
benefits as a form of deferred compensation, which the employee accepts
through job performance.2 1 Other states, while admitting that the strict
application of contract principles does not reflect the realities of public
pension programs, have nonetheless reached a similar result under theories
of quasi-contract.22
In addition to differing about how the contract is created, states
following the contract view also vary with regard to when the contract is
deemed to form. In several jurisdictions, the contract is formed as of the
first day of employment,2 3 while in others the contract is not effective until
20. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Fund v. Cary, 373 So. 2d
841, 842 (Ala. 1979); Kernv. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 801 (Cal. 1947); Colo.
Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 5 v. City of Colorado Springs, 784 P.2d 766, 770 (Colo.
1989); Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trs., 464 A.2d 894, 896 (Del. 1983); Withers v.
Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432 (Ga. 1980); Nashv. Boise City Fire Dep't., 663 P.2d 1105,
1108-09 (Idaho 1983); Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 473 (Kan. 1980); Jones v.
Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Ky. 1995); Bd. of Trs. ofEmps.' Ret.
Sys. v. Mayor of Balt. City, 562 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1989); Christensen v. Minneapolis
Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Minn. 1983); State ex rel. Sullivanv. State
Teachers' Ret. Bd., 571 P.2d 793, 795 (Mont. 1977); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d
541, 548-51 (Neb. 1995); Pub. Emps.' Ret. Bd. v. Washoe County, 615 P.2d 972, 974 (Nev.
1980); Cloutierv. State, 42 A.3d 816, 822-24 (N.H. 2012); Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54,
60-61 (N.C. 1998); Taylor v. State & Educ. Emps. Grp. Ins. Program, 897 P.2d 275, 278-79
(Okla. 1995); Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 20 (Or. 2015); Ass'n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ.
Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 965-66 (Pa. 1984); Arenav. City of
Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 393 (R.I. 2007); Taitv. Freeman, 57 N.W.2d 520, 522 (S.D.
1953); Blackwellv. Quarterly Cnty. Court, 622 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tenn. 1981); Utah Pub.
Emps.' Ass'n v. State, 131 P.3d 208, 215-16 (Utah 2006); Burlington Fire Fighters Ass'nv.
City of Burlington, 543 A.2d 686, 689 (Vt. 1988); McAllister v. City of Bellevue Firemen's
PensionBd., 210 P.3d 1002, 1004 (Wash. 2009); Boothv. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 181 (W.
Va. 1995).
21. See, e.g., Moro, 351 P.3d at 20-22; Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 296 P.2d 536, 538
(Wash. 1956).
22. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 303 N.E.2d 320, 327-28 (Mass. 1973)
(acknowledging infeasibility of fitting statutory retirement system into "ordinary contract
law," and explaining that use of "contract" in this context "is best understood as meaning
that the retirement scheme has generated material expectations on the part of employees and
those expectations should in substance be respected"); Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 748
(rejecting "conventional contract approach" to public pensions but finding protectable
interest under theory of promissory estoppel).
23. See Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 22-23 (identifying Alaska, California,
Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, and Massachusetts as employing the "first day" rule).
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the employee actually retires or is qualified to do so. 24 Still other
jurisdictions understand the contract to form at some intermediate point,
which generally depends upon the reasonable expectations and reliance
interests of the employee. 25
A final point of divergence among the "contract states" concerns
what precisely is protected by the contract once formed. For example, a
number of state courts have interpreted the public pension contract to
protect both past and future accruals of benefits, usually as a result of
language found in their state constitutions. 2 6 In these jurisdictions,
"[e]mployees who are already in the system could not be subject to any
plan amendment that results in a lower benefit than that calculated under
the terms of the plan at their dates of enrollment." 2 7 Other states-again,
typically as a result of constitutional language-construe the contract as
protecting only past benefit accruals, meaning that the government cannot
diminish benefits already earned but can amend the pension plan
prospectively.28 In most states, however, courts construe the terms of the
contract in light of the statutory language creating the pension system, as
well as the government's course of conduct relative to that system. 2 9 As
such, courts in different states can reach widely divergent results on
whether a particular benefit is included within the contract. For example,
some courts have concluded that state tax exemptions for public retirement
benefits were an included term of the pension contract, while others have
held such exemptions to lie outside the contract. 3 0 Recent litigation over
24. See id. at 26 (identifying Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Ohio as following
this "last day" rule).
25. See id. at 27; see also Singer, 607 P.2d at 474 ("Continued employment over a
reasonable period of time during which substantial services are furnished to the employer,
plan membership is maintained, and regular contributions into the fund are made . . . cause
the employee to acquire a contract right in the pension plan."); Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 62-63
(explaining that determination of whether contract forms is "rooted in the protection of
expectational interests upon which individuals have relied through their actions, thus gaining
a vested right").
26. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 622-24 (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, and
New York as following this approach).
27. Id. at 624.
28. See id. at 624-25 (placing Hawaii, Louisiana, and Michigan in this group).
29. See id. at 627 (noting that "the pension contract includes the statutory provisions
relevant to the retirement plan," as well as "long-standing administrative practices related to
the retirement plan").
30. Compare Bailey, 500 S.E.2d at 63 ("[I]t is clear the tax exemption was a term or
condition of benefits of the Retirement Systems to which plaintiffs have a contractual
right."), with Sheehy v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 762, 766 (Mont. 1993) ("We hold
that ... state employees retiring prior to [alterations in the tax exemption] did not have a
contractual right to continued exemption from taxation of their state retirement benefits.").
2017] 7
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changes to plan participants' cost-of-living adjustments similarly has
produced conflicting outcomes. 3 1
Irrespective of the aforementioned differences, once a contract is
formed, the rights and benefits of plan participants included within the
contract become subject to constitutional protections. Chief among these
protections is the prohibition against state impairment of the contractual
relationship.32 Additionally, because contracts generally qualify as property
for purposes of the Takings Clause, the restrictions of that provision also
apply. 33
C. Property View
A handful of states have rejected the view that public pension plans
create contracts and suggest instead that plan participants have rights best
described as some form of property. 3 4 Still other states, while not rejecting
the contract approach outright, seem to emphasize plan participants'
property rights as paramount when addressing changes to public pension
programs. 35
Typically, courts that reject the contract view do so as a result of
the "unmistakability doctrine," under which a statute is recognized to create
contract rights only where there is "some clear indication that the
legislature intends to bind itself contractually."36 Because "the principal
31. Compare Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 209-11 (Colo. 2014) (finding no contract
right to unchangeable COLA), with Arena v. City of Providence, 919 A.2d 379, 393-95 (R.I.
2007) (holding that retirees had right to lifetime COLA without alteration).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. . . .").
33. See U.S. Tr. Co. ofN.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) ("Contract
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for public purposes provided that just
compensation is paid."); Lynchv. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) ("Valid contracts
are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the
United States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected
by the Fifth Amendment.").
34. See, e.g., Pinemanv. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 809-10 (Conn. 1985); Spiller v.
State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n. 12 (Me. 1993); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301-02 (N.M.
1995). New Mexico has since codified this property right in its state constitution, see N.M.
CONST. art. XX, § 22(D), although the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the
provision must "be read harmoniously" with its earlier decision in Pierce. Bartlett v.
Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 892 (N.M. 2013).
35. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Horvathv. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 652
(Ohio 1998) (suggesting that participant had a cognizable property right in certain aspects of
public retirement system, but rejecting the claim that participant had contract rights); Wis.
Prof'l Police Ass'nv. Lightbourn, 627 N.W.2d 807, 840-41 (Wis. 2001) (discussing contract
rights as species of participants' protected property interests); see also Peterson v.
Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 1996) (suggesting that
"legitimate retirement expectations may constitute property rights").
36. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S.
451, 465-66 (1985); see also Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 808 (applying this rationale to public
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function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that
establish the policy of the state," 3 7 any ambiguity that the public pension
statutes were legislatively intended to bestow contract rights is resolved
against the creation of a contract. 3 8 At the same time, these courts have
declined to follow the traditional gratuity approach because it gives the
government "an unfettered power" to revoke public pension plans, resulting
in too little protection for plan participants.3 9 Accordingly, under this view,
plan participants are deemed to have property rights (though not contract
rights) in certain aspects of the plan.40
Because of these property rights, subsequent changes to the public
pension system may trigger certain constitutional concerns. At least three
courts, for example, have expressly noted that property interests in public
pension plans are subject to due process protections.4 1 Accordingly, plan
participants are entitled to notice and an opportunity to object to any
alterations of their interests,42 and such alterations must not deprive those
interests unreasonably or arbitrarily. 43 More significantly for purposes of
this Article, property rights in public pension plans are also subject to the
protections of the Takings Clause.
II. THE VALUE OF A TAKINGS CLAUSE CHALLENGE
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the vast majority of
states grant public employees some type of contract or property right in
certain aspects of their retirement benefits, and these rights are subject to
constitutional protections, including those enumerated in the Takings
Clause. But takings challenges to plan alterations have not proved very
successful.45 In large measure, this lack of success results from a tendency
pension statutes); Spiller, 627 A.2d at 515 (same); Pierce, 910 P.2d at 301 (same); Horvath,
697 N.E.2d at 652-655 (same).
37. Nat'lR.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466.
38. See, e.g., Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he language of [the
public pension statute] remains at best ambiguous, and we cannot find that the legislature as
a whole unmistakably intended to create contract rights .... ).
39. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 808; accord Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 (holding that
"retirement benefits are more than a gratuity to be granted or withheld arbitrarily at the
whim of the sovereign state").
40. See Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 n.12; Pierce, 910 P.2d at
301; Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Wis. 1996).
41. Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 517 n.12; Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-
05.
42. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304-05.
43. See Oechslin, 488 A.2d at 810.
44. See Pierce, 910 P.2d at 304 (stating that "any action by the legislature that serves
to terminate, diminish or alter the value of pension plans must be compensated"); Ass' of
State Prosecutors, 544 N.W.2d at 893 (finding that statute requiring transfer from county
pension fund to state pension fund effected a taking of county participants' property).
45. See Monahan, supra note 11, at 637 (noting that claims brought under the Takings
Clause "have been uniformly unsuccessful"); Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn 't a
2017] 9
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to treat takings claims as entirely dependent on claims brought under the
Contracts Clause, such that challenges under these two provisions rise and
fall together. 46 In the right context, such treatment makes perfect sense. In
states where the participants' interest in a pension plan is protected by
contract principles, for example, a finding that the challenged alteration is
not included within the terms of that contract means no protectable interest
has been taken and, thus, there can be no violation of the Takings Clause.
But this analysis does not always fit the legal paradigms. In Budge
v. Town ofMillinocket, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
rejected the plaintiffs' takings claim because they could not demonstrate
contract rights to the benefits at issue.48 Although the rejection of the
takings claim may ultimately have been correct, the curious thing about
Budge is that the court failed to acknowledge its prior decision in Spiller v.
State, which had indicated that legitimate retirement expectations might
qualify as property rights even absent a contract. 4 9 Although the court cited
Spiller for the proposition that no contractual relationship was created by
the retirement plan, 0 it failed to recognize Spiller's implication that a
takings claim could exist apart from such a relationship, nor did it evaluate
whether the plaintiffs had an independent property interest notwithstanding
the existence of a contract. Instead, the court simply viewed the employees'
takings challenge as derivative of their contract claim.5 '
Some scholars have taken a similar tack, describing a Takings
Clause challenge as "parasitic on a Contracts Clause claim," such that the
success of the former depends entirely on the latter.5 2 Other scholars, while
acknowledging that the Takings Clause "theoretically" might offer different
protections than the Contracts Clause, nonetheless conclude that takings
Promise: Public Employers'Ability to Alter Pension Plans ofRetired Employees, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 1673, 1693 (2011) (stating that Takings Clause challenges "have uniformly failed").
By using the term "uniformly," these commentators overstate their cases, providing another
example of the inadequate treatment takings challenges have received.
46. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58-59 (1st Cir.
1999) ("The facts here require us to consider whether plaintiffs had the requisite property
right to support a Takings Clause claim by analyzing their claim under the Contracts
Clause."); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 838 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
(stating that "analysis under ... the Takings Clause tracks the same lines as the analysis
under the Contracts Clause").
47. See Parella, 173 F.3d at 62 (" [B]ecause the plaintiffs have failed to establish a
contractual right to the withheld benefits, they cannot show that the Board took their
'property' when it withheld the benefits. . . ."); Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 213 (Colo.
2014) (finding that employees had no contract right in a particular COLA, which meant they
had no property interest for purposes of takings claim).
48. Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 55 A.3d 484, 492 (Me. 2012).
49. Spillerv. State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n.12 (Me. 1993).
50. Budge, 55 A.3d at 489-90.
51. Id. at 492.
52. Buck, supra note 4, at 93; see also id at 28 n. 10 ("A takings violation may arise
only if the plaintiffs have a contractual right to the stream of payments, which in turn means
that a takings claim usually rises or falls along with a contractual claim.").
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claims are "unlikely to add much . .. because a participant's interest in
pension promises is unlikely to be property unless it is found to be a
contractual promise protected under the Contracts Clause."53
While I agree that, in many contexts, takings challenges to public
pension reform are properly influenced by the existence of contract rights, it
is incorrect to regard such challenges as mere "tag-alongs." Doing so
overlooks the distinction between the contract and property views
articulated above and (like the court in Budge) ignores the fact that plan
participants may have protectable property rights even where no contract
exists. Additionally, viewing claims brought under the Takings Clause as
nothing more than repackaged Contracts Clause challenges discounts the
different analytical frameworks that govern those two provisions.
This Part demonstrates why the Takings Clause has independent
significance to public pension reform efforts. First, in property view states,
takings challenges may present the only viable constitutional protection to
plan participants. Second, even in contract view states, Takings Clause
analysis is distinct from that governing the Contracts Clause, and this
distinction may be significant in certain cases.
A. Property View States
In states that adopt the property view of public pensions, the
Takings Clause presents the best option for challenging plan alterations as
unconstitutional. This is so, as an initial matter, because the Contracts
Clause simply is unavailable. As explained above, courts adhering to the
property view largely reject the notion that public retirement plans create
contractual relationships between the government and its employees, 56 but
the existence of a contract is a prerequisite for bringing a claim under the
Contracts Clause. 7 Because a public pension plan creates no contractual
relationship under the property view, the Contracts Clause perforce offers
no protection to plan participants where this view is adopted.
Accordingly, plan participants must look to some other constitutional
provision for relief
53. Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 63
(2013).
54. See Buck, supra note 4, at 28 n. 10 ("In most cases, a takings clause argument
appears, if at all, only as a tag-along claim to a contracts argument.").
55. To say that the Takings Clause presents the best option is not to say that takings
challenges will necessarily be successful. The issues related to analyzing a takings claim are
addressed in Parts III & IV, infra.
56. See supra Part I.C.
57. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186-87 (1992) (identifying
existence of contractual relationship as first component of Contracts Clause analysis).
58. See, e.g., Pinemanv. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying
property view to reject Contracts Clause challenge); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 515-16
(Me. 1993) (same); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 301-02 (N.M. 1995) (same).
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One potential avenue is to challenge plan changes as violating the
Due Process Clause. For various reasons, however, such challenges are
unlikely to meet with any meaningful success. With regard to procedural
due process, for example, the legislative system itself typically will satisfy
the requirements that plan participants be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 59 Because most changes to public retirement systems are
accomplished legislatively, courts should have little trouble in determining
that these requirements are met. Likewise, in most cases, substantive due
process should pose few difficulties because courts will apply rational basis
scrutiny to any alterations made in the pension system. 60 So long as the
government can demonstrate that its pension reform measures were
rationally related to a legitimate state interest-such "as reducing
expenditures in a time of fiscal crisis"6 1-those measures will be upheld.
The other alternative is to attack plan alterations under the Takings
Clause. Although the success of a takings claim is hardly assured, courts
may find these challenges more difficult to dismiss because of their distinct
analytical framework. Unlike a substantive due process analysis, the
evaluation of a takings claim does not depend on a means-end test. In
Lingle v. Chevron US.A., the Supreme Court explained that its Takings
Clause jurisprudence focuses on the effects that result from a legislative
scheme rather than the interests that scheme is designed to promote.62 The
sort of means-end inquiry utilized under the Due Process Clause "probes [a]
regulation's underlying validity," 63 but it reveals nothing about the central
question with which the Takings Clause is concerned-i.e., whether (and
how much) the law interferes with private property rights.64 For that reason,
the Court explained, this type of inquiry "has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence."6 5
The upshot is that a takings claim cannot be rejected simply
because the government's action is reasonably linked to a legitimate goal or
59. See, e.g., Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 839 (E.D. Tenn.
2015) (concluding "[t]here is no basis for a finding that the process was lacking" where
changes to municipal pension benefits were "adopted by the City Council after lengthy
public meetings with all interested stakeholders"); Pierce, 910 P.2d at 305 (suggesting that
newspaper notices and open commrittee hearings were sufficient to meet procedural due
process requirements).
60. See Fallon, 842 F.2d at 601.
61. Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 58 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd in relevant part, 123
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997).
62. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-43 (2005).
63. Id. at 543.
64. See id. at 539 (stating that takings analysis "focuses directly upon the severity of
the burden that government imposes upon private property rights"); see also id. at 542
(explaining that means-ends test about "whether a regulation of private property is effective
in achieving some legitimate public purpose" says "nothing about the magnitude or
character ofthe burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights")
(emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 540.
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objective. Indeed, "the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has
acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose."66 Accordingly, arguments that
pension plan changes are rationally related to alleviating legitimate
budgetary concerns will most likely defeat a substantive due process
challenge, but they should have no traction in a proper Takings Clause
analysis.
B. Contract View States
A similar case can be made for the Takings Clause even where
public pensions are viewed as creating contracts. While the Contracts
Clause offers the primary source of protection in this context, the way
claims under the Contracts Clause are analyzed potentially leaves room for
a meaningful Takings Clause challenge in the right circumstances.
Per its express terms, the Contracts Clause prohibits a state from
"pass[ing] any . .. Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."67 Despite
this unqualified language, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that
"the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal
exactness like a mathematical formula." 68 The limitations imposed by the
Contracts Clause must be balanced, the Court has explained, against the
sovereignty of the states and their needs to utilize that sovereignty in the
best interests of their citizens.6 9
The first step in this analytical balancing act is to determine
whether the state action being challenged "has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship."70 This step thus
depends on a showing that: (1) a contractual relationship exists; (2) a
change in the law impaired that relationship; and (3) the resulting
impairment qualifies as substantial.7 Where any of these characteristics is
missing, there is no violation. But even where the state has substantially
impaired a contract, its action may still be upheld if the impairment was
"reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."7 2 The
66. Id. at 543.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Most state constitutions contain a similar provision. See,
e.g., COLO. CONST. art II, § 11 ("No ... law impairing the obligation of contracts ... shall be
passed by the general assembly."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("No ... law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be enacted by the legislature."). Moreover, when interpreting
these provisions, state courts typically apply federal Contracts Clause analysis. See, e.g.,
Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208 (Colo. 2014) (noting state adoption of federal Contracts
Clause test); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 295 (N.M. 1995) (same).
68. U.S. Tr. Co. ofN.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (quoting Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'nv. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934)).
69. See id.
70. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
71. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
72. U.S. Tr. Co. ofNY, 431 U.S. at 25; see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan.
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983) (explaining that impairment of contract
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analysis for a Contracts Clause challenge thus incorporates a means-end test
similar to that used for substantive due process claims. So long as the
government can demonstrate the appropriate relationship between the
challenged legislation and a sufficient governmental interest, no
constitutional violation will be found.7 3
As shown above, this type of means-end analysis is improper under
the Takings Clause. A takings claim is concerned with the government's
effect on private property rights; neither the legitimacy of the government's
goals nor the rationality of the government's method can deflect a takings
challenge. For this reason, a substantial pension modification that is
justified as reasonable and necessary under the Contracts Clause might still
effect a taking of property because the purpose for which the modification
was implemented is irrelevant to the takings inquiry.74
III. EVALUATING WHETHER "PROPERTY" HAS BEEN "TAKEN"
Having demonstrated that the Takings Clause presents an
independently significant piece of the pension reform puzzle, the next issue
is to consider how challenges brought under that Clause should be
evaluated. Such consideration requires a basic understanding of the manner
in which the Takings Clause has been implemented by the courts, focusing
on three foundational questions: (1) whether the government has taken
private property; (2) whether any taking is for a public use; and (3) whether
the owner has received just compensation for the taking. This Part
addresses the first of those questions, leaving the second and third questions
for Part IV.7 1
may be justified if based upon "reasonable conditions" and "of a character appropriate to"
some "significant and legitimate public purpose").
73. See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union, Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 340 v. Mayor of
Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1018-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that temporary salary reductions for
public school teachers constituted a substantial impairment of contract but one that was
justified as reasonable and necessary).
74. See Beermann, supra note 53, at 64 (noting "the government's justification for a
taking is irrelevant"); Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 20 n. 102 (same); cf Cherry v. Mayor
of Balt., 762 F.3d 366, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Contracts Clause claimbut vacating
trial court's dismissal of public employees' takings claims and remanding those claims for
further proceedings).
75. Although these discussions focus on federal constitutional requirements, as noted
above, most state constitutions contain similar constraints on the government's taking
authority. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Moreover, although some differences
exist between state and federal takings law, state courts tend to follow federal decisions in
this area with regard to most issues. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 100-01 (Cal. 2002) ("[W]e appear to have construed the [federal and
state takings] clauses congruently."); E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038,
1045 n.10 (Colo. 2004) ("[W]e have considered decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the federal takings clause as a guide in determining what constitutes a
taking.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d
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A. The "Property" Requirement
Because the Takings Clause only applies to takings, an initial
question is whether the government has taken private property at all.76 To
answer this question affirmatively, two independent requirements must be
satisfied. The first of these is that the claimant must have a protected
property interest at the time the taking is alleged to have occurred.77 As
demonstrated above, the existence of a property interest is largely defined
by state law,7' and the vast majority of states view public pension plans as
giving participants either a contract or property right in at least some
portion of their benefits. 79 For this reason, in the context of public pension
reform, evaluating whether a property interest exists should be relatively
straightforward in most cases. The plans at issue will either create contract
or property rights in the benefit being modified or they won't.
B. The "Taking" Requirement
Demonstrating that the claimant has a property interest leads to the
second and more challenging requirement-i.e., the governmental activity
being complained of must, in fact, amount to a taking of the interest for
which protection is sought. 0 In this regard, the courts have made clear that
not every governmental action affecting private property is compensable.8 '
233, 240-41 (Tenn. 2014) (listing states that apply federal regulatory takings framework to
claims brought under state constitutional provisions).
76. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013)
("[T]he Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy-just compensation-only for
takings.").
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
79. See supra Parts J.B & I.C.
80. See, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
81. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (stating that "not every
destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense"); see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223
(1986) (" [I]t cannot be said that the Taking Clause is violated whenever legislation requires
one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another."). As the Supreme Court has
explained, the applicability of the Takings Clause to a particular case often depends on
context:
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property, the
fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the
owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes
restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or
appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is
more complex.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17
(2002).
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Determining when a legislative or regulatory restriction,82 in particular,
amounts to a taking has proved troublesome, and the conventional wisdom
is that takings doctrine is a "muddle."83 Even so, the Supreme Court over
time has brought a modicum of clarity to this issue, culminating in a multi-
tiered analytical framework.
1. Analytical Framework for Determining a "Taking"
Under this framework, the first question is whether the challenger
can prove that the law forces him to suffer a permanent physical invasion or
occupation of his property. 5 If so, then the law effects a taking per se and
no other factors need to be considered.86
Where no permanent physical invasion occurs, however, the
framework moves to a second query, asking whether the challenger can
prove what has been termed a "total" taking-i.e., that the law deprived
him of all economically productive use of the property. 7 An affirmative
answer to this question raises the presumption that a taking has occurred
and shifts the burden of proof to the government, which may rebut the
presumption by demonstrating that the law accomplishes nothing more than
what could have been achieved under the law of nuisance or similar
"background principles" of the law of property." Where the government
meets this burden, no compensable taking has occurred; otherwise, the
presumption of a taking stands and the government must compensate the
owner. 89
Finally, if a case cannot be resolved under either of the foregoing
analyses, the framework resorts to "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"
driven by three factors. 90 Known as the Penn Central test, this analysis
applies to the vast majority of takings challenges and assesses an alleged
taking based on: (1) the economic impact of the law or regulation being
challenged; (2) the extent to which the law or regulation interferes with the
claimant's distinct, investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character
of the governmental action, which generally distinguishes between those
82. Because most public pension reforms are enacted as legislative or regulatory
modifications to existing plans, challenges to those enactments fall within the branch of
takings law known as "regulatory takings." Cf Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321-
23 (distinguishing between "physical takings" and "regulatory takings").
83. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
84. See generally Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 94-
101 (2008) (explaining framework).
85. Id. at 94.
86. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
87. Kent, supra note 84, at 95.
88. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-32 (1992).
89. Kent, supra note 84, at 96.
90. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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activities appearing appropriative in nature and those that merely adjust
"the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." 91
2. Difficulties in Applying the Framework to Public Pension
Reform
Most of the decisions establishing and applying the foregoing
framework involved takings challenges to land use regulations, and though
not without problems, the framework clearly is designed to operate within
that milieu. It remains less certain how the analysis functions in other
regulatory contexts, and this is true of public pension reform in particular.
Chief among the issues that must be addressed is which portion of the
framework is most appropriate for analyzing a challenge to pension reform
legislation. Is altering a promised retirement benefit akin to "invading" or
"occupying" the participants' interests in that benefit, such that the per se
rule applies? What would it mean in the pension reform context to deny
participants "all economically beneficial or productive use "92 of their
property, so as to qualify for a "total" taking? Or is pension reform more
properly viewed as a garden-variety economic regulation that should be
analyzed under the Penn Central factors?
The answers to these questions have obvious significance.
Successfully arguing that a particular reform falls within either the per se
rule or the "total" taking analysis would clearly favor plan participants. The
per se rule, once triggered, automatically means a taking has occurred, and
the only real issue remaining is the amount of compensation the
government must pay to the property owner. Similarly, triggering the
"total" taking test will require the government to compensate the property
owner unless it can rebut the presumption that a taking has occurred. By
contrast, the Penn Central test is, in practice, more deferential to the
government, and claims analyzed under that test typically meet with little
success. 93 As in other areas of constitutional law, framing the issues so as to
fall within the right analytical test can be outcome-determinative of a
9 1. Id.
92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
93. Numerous scholars have noted that the government wins a substantial percentage
of cases analyzed under the Penn Central factors. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do
Owners Have a Fair Chance ofPrevailing Under the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of
Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 121, 141 (2003)
(reviewing data and concluding that, for claims analyzed under Penn Central, "owners
prevailed in 13.4% of the cases where the merits were addressed"); Basil H. Mattingly,
Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual ofBalancing in Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 695, 744 (2000) (reviewing data to conclude that
government wins eighty-five percent of Penn Central cases brought in federal district courts
and sixty-seven percent of such cases brought in Court of Federal Claims); Adam R.
Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing Test Or a One Strike Rule?,
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677, 698 (2013) (reviewing data from three federal circuits and concluding
that plaintiffs have a success rate of "only 4.0% in all cases citing to Penn Central").
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takings claim. Unfortunately, as with most things in the law of takings,
choosing the appropriate test in the context of public pension reform is
anything but straightforward.
C. Choosing the Proper Test
When considering the three choices available, perhaps the safest
proposition is that the "total" taking analysis is the least likely to apply.
Short of the politically unviable course of eradicating pension plans and all
accrued benefits in their entirety, it is difficult to envision a reform measure
that could truly be said to deprive participants of all economic value in the
plans.94 Indeed, the only court found to have addressed the "total" taking
issue in the public pension reform context explicitly rejected its
applicability. 9 5 Accordingly, whether any specific reform measure qualifies
as a taking will most likely depend on whether a court chooses to apply the
per se rule for physical invasions or the more pervasive and deferential
Penn Central test. The arguments for both choices are highlighted below,
beginning with Penn Central.
1. The Case for the Penn Central Test
The courts that have most meaningfully analyzed takings
challenges to pension reform measures have done so under the Penn
Central test,96 with some explicitly rejecting the per se rule's applicability
in this context.9 7 This result is hardly surprising. For starters, although there
are notable exceptions, the Supreme Court has exhibited a general
reluctance to employ categorical analyses under the Takings Clause.
Throughout its takings decisions, the Court repeatedly has expressed a
preference for case-by-case inquiries, 9 8 and individual justices have
94. But see Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-R.I. by Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys.,
890 F. Supp. 1143, 1166 (D.R.I. 1995) (analyzing under Penn Central legislation that
removed plaintiffs from public retirement system and extinguished all credits accrued).
95. See Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 59 (D. Me. 1996), rev'd on other grounds,
123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that legislation raising the retirement age, increasing early
retirement penalty, and altering method of calculating benefits did not constitute "an
elimination of the economic value of [participants'] benefits").
96. See, e.g., Pinemanv. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1988); Parker, 937 F.
Supp. at 58-59; Scigulinksy, 890 F. Supp. at 1166; State ex. rel. Horvathv. State Teachers
Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 650-51 (Ohio 1998).
97. See, e.g., Parker, 937 F. Supp. at 59; Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 648-49.
98. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) ("Our regulatory takings jurisprudence ... is characterized by
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of
all the relevant circumstances.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) ("[W]e have eschewed the
development of any set formula for identifying a 'taking' forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment, and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of
each particular case.").
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reinforced that point in concurring and dissenting opinions.99 Moreover, in
its most comprehensive discussion of takings doctrine, the Court explained
that, apart from the "two relatively narrow categories" of physical invasions
and total economic deprivations, "regulatory takings challenges are
governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central."'00 In light of these
statements, any attempt to broaden the scope of the per se rule is likely to
face an uphill battle.
Related to the Court's general aversion to categorical rules is the
chief purpose for which its takings doctrine appears to exist. The decision
rules that make up the law of takings are an example of what Brannon
Denning and I elsewhere label "anti-evasion doctrines" ("AEDs")-i.e.,
gap-filling standards designed to prevent the government from formally
complying with a previously-announced rule while actually undermining
the substance the rule was designed to protect.' 0 In this regard, takings
doctrine seeks to curb governmental efforts to evade the just compensation
requirement by regulating property rather than appropriating it. Where the
regulation has the same effects as appropriation, takings doctrine requires
just compensation to be paid irrespective of the governmental action
formally employed.1 0 2 But the decision to utilize an AED, as well as the
level of scrutiny to be employed, largely depends on how courts balance the
risks posed by the allegedly evasive conduct versus those posed by
heightened judicial intervention.1 0 3 Of particular importance to this risk
assessment, Denning and I argue, is the existence of political safeguards
that can be expected to adequately prevent governmental overreaching. 0 4
When applied to the public pension context, these concepts would
seem to favor the more deferential Penn Central approach. The financial
consequences of the current situation are both widespread and relatively
99. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must
be resisted."); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("If one fact about the Court's takings jurisprudence can be stated without
contradiction, it is that the particular circumstances of each case determine whether a
specific restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay
compensation.") (internal quotations omitted).
100. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). The Court also set apart
"the special context of land-use exactions," id, which obviously have no bearing on the
evaluation of public pension reform.
101. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in
Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH L. REv. 1773, 1779 (2012).
102. See id. at 1777 (characterizing takings doctrine as AED); see also Michael B.
Kent, Jr., Viewing the Supreme Court's Exactions Cases Through the Prism ofAnti-Evasion,
87 U. COLO. L. REv. 827, 852-55 (2016) (same).
103. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Judicial Doctrine as Risk
Regulation, 82 TENN. L. REv. 405, 418-25 (2015) (arguing that doctrinal formation results,
in part, from justices' perceptions of, and attempts to manage, risk to constitutional
propositions posed by government action).
104. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in Constitutional
Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 397, 424 (2014).
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well-known, while the potential policy solutions require complex and
multifaceted considerations. As such, one would expect the political
process by which reform measures are enacted to be robust and well-
attended by the various interests involved. Under these circumstances, there
is no guarantee that judicial involvement would outperform the political
process. Indeed, given the potential for unintended errors, the costs of such
involvement could be quite high. For these reasons, the Penn Central
factors may present a safer course than the more intrusive per se rule.
Further bolstering the popularity of the Penn Central factors is that
the Court has applied them in a series of cases addressing private sector
retirement legislation. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, for example, the Court utilized the Penn Central test to
evaluate a takings challenge to the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA").os Designed to address financial
instability in multiemployer pension plans caused by the withdrawal of
individual employers from those plans, the MPPAA required withdrawing
employers to pay to the plan a sum representing that employer's
proportionate share of the plan's unvested benefits, irrespective of the
employer's liability under the plan contracts.1 06 Employers subject to this
"withdrawal liability" asserted that the statute violated the Takings Clause
by requiring them to transfer private assets to the plans without
compensation. Although the Court acknowledged that the employers would
be permanently deprived of the assets used to pay the liability, 0 7 it
nonetheless indicated that the per se rule was inapplicable because "the
Government does not physically invade or permanently appropriate any of
the employer's assets for its own use."'os The Court reaffirmed this
conclusion seven years later when it revisited the MPPAA's withdrawal
liability provisions,109 and it reached a similar result in a case brought
against federal legislation that required coal industry employers to
contribute to a multiemployer benefit plan for industry retirees and their
dependents." 0
Although each of these cases involved an alleged taking of property
belonging to a plan employer, the basic principles clearly can be translated
to takings claims brought by plan participants. If forcing employers to pay
amounts into a plan over and above their contractual liabilities does not
amount to a permanent occupation of the sums paid, then forcing
105. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
106. Id. at 216-17.
107. Id. at 222.
108. Id. at 225.
109. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 643
(1993) ("We reject [the challenger's] contention that the appropriate analytical framework is
the one employed in our cases dealing with permanent physical occupation. . . .").
110. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 530 (1998) (plurality) (concluding that liability
for fund contributions "is not ... a permanent physical occupation ... of the kind that we
have viewed as a per se taking").
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employees to accept alterations or reductions in the benefits received
arguably should be viewed the same way."' And, in fact, several lower
courts have relied on this line of decisions to evaluate claims brought by
public employees.112 Echoing Penn Central's own admonition that "[a]
taking may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good,"ll 3 these courts
have found that public pension modifications fall within the latter
characterization." 4
Finally, utilizing the Penn Central test avoids any difficulty in
analogizing pension reform legislation to a "physical" invasion or
occupation of land. The principal cases developing the per se rule all
concerned government actions that forced a private landowner to surrender
his right to exclude others."' The unifying theme in these cases is that each
concerned an entry onto the physical boundaries of the property without the
consent of the owner. In other words, each case involved an action that
resembled a trespass. But that resemblance is not as evident when it comes
to public pension reform. In the latter context, the property at issue
normally will consist of promises to hold plan funds in a certain manner, to
pay benefits upon the achievement of certain criteria, and to calculate those
benefits according to a prescribed method. It is difficult, at least on the
surface, to see how modifications to those promises constitute a trespass or
entry upon the plan participants' interests. Unlike land, promises cannot be
physically inhabited.116
For the foregoing reasons, I agree that the Penn Central test is an
easier fit for evaluating challenges to public pension reform, as well as the
111. A potential distinction between Connolly and its progeny, on the one hand, and
public pension reform, on the other, is that public pension alterations could be viewed as
appropriations by the government itself. Cf Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (noting that
government did not "permanently appropriate any of the employer's assets for its own use")
(emphasis added). For a discussion of this argument, see infra Part III.C.2.
112. See Pinemanv. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Connolly); Parker
v. Wakelin, 937 F. Supp. 46, 58 (D. Me. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1997) (same); State ex. rel. Horvathv. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio
1998) (same).
113. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
114. Fallon, 842 F.2d at 602; Parker, 937 F. Supp. at 59; Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 649.
115. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (finding taking under state law that required landowner to permit installation of cable
television facilities on roof of her building); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
(finding taking where government's use of nearby land for airport resulted in regular flights
over plaintiff's parcel at significantly low altitudes); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal
Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (finding taking where government permanently flooded plaintiffs
land in connection with dam project).
116. Cf Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 649 (distinguishing pension reform from leading case
employing per se rule because that case "involved a permanent physical occupation of real
property") (emphasis in original).
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test most likely to be used by courts engaged in that evaluation. Even so,
viewing the per se rule as wholly inapplicable to this context seems too
narrow an interpretation of the rule, which the Court itself has applied to
interests other than real property. The arguments for applying the per se
rule should not be overlooked, and it is to those arguments that this Article
now turns.
2. The Case for the Per Se Rule
On at least two occasions, the Supreme Court has referenced the
per se rule, either directly or indirectly, in cases involving the alleged taking
of a property interest other than land. In Webb 's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith, for example, the Court considered a dispute involving the
ownership of accrued interest on interpleaded funds paid into a state court's
registry. 117 The receiver appointed to handle distribution of the funds
asserted that the interest belonged to the prevailing parties, but a state
statute provided that such interest belonged to the government. Siding with
the receiver, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute amounted to a
taking because it broke with the ordinary rule that owners of the principal
also own the interest accruing thereon. Describing the statute as "a forced
contribution to general governmental revenues," the Court analogized the
situation to that at issue in one of the early per se cases because, in both, the
government used private property for its own purposes without the
permission of the owner."s "The state statute," the Court concluded, "has
the practical effect of appropriating for the [government] the value of the
use of the fund."ll 9
The Court seemingly returned to this rationale several years later in
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.120 That case involved a state
program requiring that accrued interest on lawyers' trust accounts
("IOLTA") be used to pay for indigent legal services. Having previously
held that such interest belonged to the clients whose funds were invested in
the accounts,121 the Court then addressed whether the mandatory use of that
interest under the IOLTA program constituted a taking. Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens couldn't quite bring himself to say that a taking
had occurred,1 2 2 but he suggested that the per se rule for physical invasions
would be the most appropriate test under which to make that
determination.1 23 The transfer of the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts,
117. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
118. Id. at 163-64 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
119. Id. at 164.
120. Brownv. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
121. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165-72 (1998).
122. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 233 ("[W]e must address the type oftaking, ifany, that
this case involves.") (emphasis added); id. at 235 ("We therefore assume that .. . [the
plaintiffs'] interest was taken. . . .") (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 235.
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he explained, was "akin to the occupation of a small amount of rooftop
space" that the Court addressed in the leading case applying the per se
rule.1 24 Inasmuch as neither bank accounts nor the interest earned on them
can be physically inhabited or entered into, Justice Stevens's analogy to an
"occupation" suggests that the per se rule encompasses more. The rule
applies, it would seem, where the government affirmatively takes for itself
or transfers to another the use of private property for public purposes.1 25
In both cases, then, the Court equated the rule's references to
"invasion" or "occupation" with a similar, though not entirely synonymous,
term-i.e., "appropriation." So construed, the per se rule may more readily
fit the public pension reform context, as evidenced by a few state court
decisions that tacitly apply that approach. Where Wisconsin gave members
of a county-run plan the option to join a state-run plan, mandating a transfer
of employer contributions from one plan to the other for any participant
exercising that option, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the law
requiring the transfer effected a taking. 2 6 "Vested County Plan
beneficiaries have protectable property interests in the integrity and security
of their retirement funds," the court explained, and the statute took that
property interest by appropriating funds previously held by the county plan
to the benefit of members enrolled in the state plan.1 27
A similar rationale appears to have animated the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. State,128 although the conclusory
analysis in that case leaves much to be desired. Bailey involved an
adjustment to the tax-exempt status of state and local retirement benefits.
Initially, those benefits were exempted entirely from state taxation, but the
legislature later capped the tax exemption to apply only to $4,000 of
benefits per year.1 29 Concluding that the retirement plans created a
contractual relationship between the state and plan participants, and that the
tax exemption was a term of the contract so created, the court determined
that the change in the exemption amounted to an uncompensated taking of
the participants' property.1 30 Although the court offered little analytical
124. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
125. See id. at 240 ("A law that requires that the interest on [IOLTA] funds be
transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use . . . could be a per se taking
requiring the payment of 'just compensation' to the client."). Such affirmative action is
distinguished from mere regulation, which might restrict the use of private property but does
not necessarily compel its use by or for someone other than the owner. Cf Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980) (explaining that transfer of
interest on funds deposited into court's registry was forced appropriation of fund's beneficial
use rather than mere economic adjustment for common good).
126. Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. 1996).
127. Id.; see also id. at 894 (equating statute to confiscation of county plan members'
property).
128. Bailey v. State, 500 S.E.2d 54 (1998).
129. Id at 58-59.
130. Id at 69.
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support for that determination,131 it is not difficult to place the decision
within the per se rule as articulated above. Under the contracts establishing
the retirement system, the property belonging to the participants included
100% of every dollar in benefits paid, without having to remit anything
back to the state in the form of taxes. By subsequently capping the amount
of benefits eligible for the tax exemption, however, the state reduced the
real amount paid to the participants by the amount of taxes now due. As
such, much like the account interest at issue in Webb 's and Brown, the state
effectively appropriated the use of the benefits subject to taxation for its
own purposes.
By far the clearest application of the per se rule in the context of
public employee benefits comes from a recent decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals. In AFT Michigan v. State,132 the court addressed the
constitutionality of a statute that required all public school employees to
contribute three percent of their salaries to a non-vesting retiree health
benefit program. After concluding that the employees' salaries constituted
"specific funds in which they unquestionably had a property interest," 33 the
court then found that the forced contribution to the retirement fund
constituted a seizure of the employees' property. Citing to both Webb 's and
Brown, the court explained: "The law is ... clear that where the
government ... asserts ownership of a specific and identifiable 'parcel' of
money, it does implicate the Takings Clause. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has termed such actions 'per se' violations of the Takings
Clause." 34 Put differently, by appropriating for its own benefit a portion of
the employees' salaries, the state had triggered the per se rule and taken
private property without compensation.
Applying the reasoning of these cases to contemporary reform
efforts indicates that at least some modifications to public pensions might
fall under the per se rule. While most of these reforms do not include an
overt transfer of promised benefits to another party, many of the measures
recently attempted or discussed could be viewed as having a similar effect.
Changes in the formulae by which benefits are calculated, reductions in
stated COLAs, or even a required increase in the employees' own
contributions all have the consequence of decreasing the amount of benefits
ultimately paid to plan participants. Where these participants have a vested
right in the benefits affected, the reductions arguably are the equivalent of
the government appropriating the participants' property (or a portion
131. See id. (stating simply that "it is clear that the State has taken plaintiffs' private
property" because alteration of exemption was "in derogation of plaintiffs' rights established
through the retirement benefits contracts").
132. AFT Michiganv. State, No. 303702, 2016 WL 3176812 (Mich. Ct. App. June 7,
2016).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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thereof) to fulfill its own purposes or obligations.1 3 5 As the foregoing cases
suggest, that type of appropriation might trigger the per se rule and thus
constitute a compensable taking.
IV. EVALUATING "PUBLIC USE" AND "JUST COMPENSATION"
Although it is much easier to demonstrate a taking under the per se
rule than the Penn Central test, in either case a determination that the
government has in fact taken private property forces a consideration of the
public use and just compensation requirements. With regard to public
pension reform, just compensation is by far the more troublesome issue, as
the following discussions demonstrate.
A. The "Public Use" Requirement
At least for purposes of federal law, the "public use" requirement
has long been interpreted to include any measure justified by a "public
purpose," 36 which is defined broadly and with deference to legislative
determinations.1 3 7 Accordingly, the government typically has wide latitude
in determining when and how the taking power should be utilized.
Moreover, in the context of regulatory takings, there is a general
presumption that the government's action is supported by a public purpose.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has rejected the incorporation of
means-end analyses into its Takings Clause jurisprudence, concluding that
questions concerning the government's purposes for regulating are more
properly addressed under the Due Process Clause.1 38 Such inquiries are
"logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation
effects a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. Put differently, a
government action that advances no public purpose will violate due process
and be unconstitutional for that reason alone. 40 By the time the analysis
135. Cf Boothv. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 187 (W. Va. 1995) ("Requiring the [plan
participants] to protect the future solvency of the pension system is an unconstitutional
shifting of the state's own burden.") (emphasis added); see also Scott v. Williams, 107 So.
3d 379, 397 (Fla. 2013) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (arguing that reform legislation converting
state retirement system from noncontributory to contributory, mandating employees
contribute three percent of salaries, and eliminating COLAs was "a confiscation of private
property of a few for a public use").
136. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479-80 (2005) ("[W]henthis
Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 1 9 th century, it
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose."').
137. Id. ("Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting
our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.").
138. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
139. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
140. Id
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turns to the Takings Clause, the validity of the government's purpose is
theoretically established.
Applying these principles to public pension modifications suggests
that, in most cases, the public use requirement should be satisfied rather
easily. So long as "the asserted public purpose is to avert fiscal calamity
and its negative consequences,"' 4 ' it is difficult to imagine a court finding
the public use requirement has been violated.
B. The "Just Compensation" Requirement
After a taking is determined to be for a public use, the final
requirement imposed by the Takings Clause is that of "just compensation."
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the constitutional remedy is not to
prohibit the taking,1 42 but rather to ensure that the owner "be put in as good
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken." 43 Thus, the
owner typically is entitled to "the fair market value of the property on the
date it is appropriated," 44 which "is measured by the property owner's loss
rather than the government's gain."145
Although these principles appear fairly straightforward, they often
raise difficult issues,1 4 6 and this is no less true in the context of public
pension modifications. It is not within the scope of this Article either to
provide a full critique of the law of just compensation or to apply that law
definitively to public pension reform. Rather, as with the question of
whether a reform takes plan participants' property, I seek only to highlight
the issues and arguments that litigants and courts will need to address.
1. "Dollar-for-Dollar" Valuation
From the participants' vantage point, the value of the property lost
as a result of pension reform would most likely be the dollar amount by
141. Adam Riff, Note, The Eminent Domain Path Out of a Public Pension Crisis, 37
CARDozoL.REv. 307, 334 (2015).
142. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482
U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
143. Olsonv. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
144. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); accord Home v.
Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015).
145. Brownv. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003).
146. There is an inherent tension, for example, in the Court's statements that a property
owner should be made whole and its application of the fair market value standard, which
"excludes whole categories of damages ... suffered by the property owner." Christopher
Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005). Aside from this tension, the concept of fair market value
itself "necessarily includes a host of background decisions that influence the size of awards."
Id. at 704.
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which their benefits were allegedly reduced. 4 7 To state it differently, plan
participants would want to argue that the measure of just compensation is
the difference between the benefits they would have received absent the
modification and what they actually received as a result of the
modification. 4" This measurement, so the argument goes, would most
correctly represent the loss to plan participants and most adequately make
them whole.149
Using such a formula, however, would likely have the practical
result of prohibiting the taking altogether, rather than simply remunerating
the property owner. Public pension reforms are typically enacted to
alleviate dire fiscal circumstances, meaning that concerns already exist
about the government's ability fully to satisfy its plan obligations.
Requiring the government to pay those obligations anyway effectively
nullifies the reform. Moreover, given the government's potential liability
for interest, attorney fees, and other costs of litigating challenges, the
government may ultimately find itself in a worse financial situation after
the reform than before.15 0
2. Arguments Against "Dollar-for-Dollar" Valuation
That plan participants should be awarded compensation exactly
equal to their pre-reform benefits, however, is not a foregone conclusion.
To begin with, it is not certain that such an award represents fair market
value in the first place. The Supreme Court typically defines fair market
value as "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." 5 ' The
lack of a functioning market for a particular species of property may make
market value too difficult to discern and, thus, inappropriate to use as an
assessment mechanism.1 5 2 This concept could be applied to public pension
147. See Riff, supra note 141, at 335 n.151 (suggesting that value of property owned by
"a retired public worker who is already collecting pension benefits" would likely be
"equivalent to the amount already owed under the pension plan").
148. See Reinke, supra note 45, at 1698 (suggesting that fair market value of reduced
benefits is "easily calculated" via this formula). If this amount was paid immediately upon
entry of judgment, it would presumably be adjusted to reflect the present value of any future
benefits not yet payable under the initial terms of the plan.
149. Some courts seem to agree. See, e.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-R.I. by Scigulinsky v. Ret.
Bd. of R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp. 1143, 1166 (D.R.I. 1995) (holding that plan
participants adequately alleged lack of just compensation by pleading that "value of the
extinguished retirement benefits is greater than the amount of money that would be returned
to the plaintiffs by the [challenged] statute").
150. See generally Wis. Retired Teachers Ass'nv. Emp. Tr. Funds Bd., 558 N.W.2d 83
(Wis. 1997) (requiring government to refund all amounts taken, with interest, and awarding
attorney fees).
151. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
152. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
(stating that other measures ofjust compensation may be utilized "when market value has
been too difficult to find"); United States v. 564.4 Acres, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) ("The
instances in which market value is too difficult to ascertain generally involve property of a
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benefits, "which generally are not assignable, and therefore cannot be
bought and sold."l 5 3 Because these benefits are not freely traded on the
open market, it is not necessarily clear that the exact dollar amounts
initially promised to public employees are the actual "market value" of the
property held by those employees.
Additionally, even if it best represents the market value of their
property, a strict dollar-for-dollar equivalent to participants' alleged
reductions may be too speculative, at least as to some portion of the benefits
claimed.' 5 4 In this regard, consider United States v. Commodities Trading
Corporation, where the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate measure
of compensation due for a wartime governmental requisition of 760,000
tons of privately-owned black pepper.15 5 Noting that the price of pepper at
the time of the requisition was subject to governmental price-fixing by the
Office of Price Administration, the trial court nonetheless added to the fixed
price a so-called "retention value." 56 According to the trial court, this
"retention value" represented the owner's right to hold the property until
after the wartime price-fixing program had ceased, when the owner
presumably could have sold the pepper for higher prices (an option
foreclosed by the government's taking of the pepper).15 7 The Court rejected
the inclusion of this "retention value," however, as too uncertain:
[N]o one knew how long the war would last nor how long
economic conditions due to war might lead Congress to
continue price-fixing legislation. Predictions on these
subjects were guesses, not informed forecasts. And even if
such predictions were reasonably certain, there remained
other unknowns. How much more than the ceiling price
would a speculative purchaser have paid for property at the
time of seizure? To what extent, if at all, would the lifting
type so infrequently traded that we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid,
assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the condemned
property.").
153. Riff, supra note 141, at 335-36 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8346(a)); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-332(a)(3) ("The right to a pension, annuity, retirement allowance, return of
contributions, the pension, annuity, or retirement allowance itself, any optional benefit, or
any other right accrued or accruing to any person under [the Employees' Retirement System
of Georgia] . . . are . . . [n]ot assignable. . . ."); Hamlinv. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. ex rel. State,
359 P.3d 581, 583 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) ("[A]s a general rule, a [Public Employees
Retirement System] member's retirement account is not assignable. . . .").
154. See Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 126-27 (rejecting inclusion of certain
values because of "the highly speculative nature of proof' necessary for them); Dep't of
Transp. v. M.M. Fowler, Inc., 637 S.E.2d 885, 892 (N.C. 2006) (explaining that just
compensation principles "do not require the expenditure of taxpayer funds for losses ... too
speculative to calculate with certainty").
155. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 122.
156. Id. at 123.
157. Id. at 125.
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of war controls raise prices above the controlled ceilings?
And as of what date should future value be estimated?158
Because there were no sound answers to these questions at the time
of the taking, the "retention value" had to be excluded from the
compensation award.
An analogy could be made to the calculation of promised pension
benefits, at least for those that have not yet fully accrued as of the date of
the reform. The amount of benefits to which an individual employee is
entitled under most state and municipal systems often depends on the
employee's age at retirement, number of years worked, and final average
salary.1 59 To the extent that any of these factors remains unknown at the
time of the taking-that is, at the time of the plan modification-the
valuation of pre-reform benefits arguably could be viewed as too
speculative to support a compensation award based upon them.1 60
Lastly, even where these amounts are not too difficult to calculate,
there remains the question of whether a dollar-for-dollar valuation would
work a "manifest injustice" to either the plan participants or the public at
large.161 In the worst case scenario, requiring government employers to pay
in full the amount of promised benefits without adjustment could have a
number of severe societal consequences, including drastic tax increases,
default on other governmental obligations, and loss of certain governmental
services. And it could have adverse consequences on public employees as
well, including reductions in the public workforce, salary and hiring
freezes, bankruptcy (for municipal employers),1 6 2 and the collapse of the
pension system. In this parade of horribles, it may be that requiring
governments to compensate plan participants for every dollar allegedly lost
would work a "manifest injustice."
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have
defined "manifest injustice" or explained when it might justify a deviation
from fair market value. Perhaps the phrase is best interpreted in light of the
Court's oft-stated emphasis that the Fifth Amendment's compensation
remedy "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be bome by
the public as a whole." 63
158. Id. at 126-27.
159. See Buck, supra note 4, at 33-34.
160. Riff, supra note 141, at 337-38.
161. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 123 (stating that alternative methods of
valuation are appropriate where fair market value "would result in manifest injustice to
owner or public").
162. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2012) (providing for municipal bankruptcy); see also
Beermann, supra note 53, at 76 (noting that "there is no provision for state governments to
file for bankruptcy under federal law").
163. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
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From the perspective of plan participants, of course, this notion
would favor a dollar-for-dollar valuation of their lost property because
"fairness and justice" requires the government to live up to its promises.
Moreover, if tax increases and lost services are the price for doing so, then
at least the public as a whole (and not just the subset of government
employees/retirees) pays the price. On one level, this argument has
particular force. After all, the public pension crisis is the result of
government officials seeking to fulfill an ever-expanding demand for
government services by the same public that generally revolts against
increased taxes.1 6 4 To the extent that those officials, with the tacit approval
of taxpayers, have been underfunding those promises, it seems reasonable
that all parties should share in the burden of "making things right."
But on another level, perhaps it's not that easy. Do "fairness and
justice" dictate, for example, fiscal and governmental calamity because the
government, in more prosperous times, made promises to a subset of the
population? Does the just compensation requirement demand that public
services be placed at risk to satisfy obligations that now seem imprudent or
harmful? Another anchor tenet of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence is that changes in property rights must occasionally occur to
promote the public interest, and that "Government hardly could go on" if
every jot and tittle of these changes must be recompensed.1 65 Some losses,
the Court has explained, are "properly treated as part of the burden of
common citizenship." 66
In short, different maxims support varying views as to whether plan
participants should receive the full equivalent of their reduced benefits as
just compensation. As with most things in the law of takings, the relevant
decisions contain, at best, general precepts that often appear to be in
competition with one another and foreclose certain predictions or easy
application. Suffice it to say, there are serious arguments on both sides of
this question, and its resolution awaits development in future litigation.
3. The Possibility of Non-Cash Compensation
A final issue worthy of consideration is whether state and local
employers might provide compensation to plan participants through means
other than cash payments, thereby reducing some of the fiscal concerns that
164. See Beermann, supra note 53, at 26-27 (comparing unfunded pension promises to
other types of deficit spending).
165. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'nv. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987) ("The Takings
Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific
individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received.
Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no
one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes
paid and the dollar value of benefits received.").
166. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
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a taking might otherwise produce. In this regard, the Supreme Court has
made clear that "consideration other than cash . .. may be counted in the
determination of just compensation."l 67 Such non-cash compensation may
include benefits conferred upon the property owner as a consequence of the
taking itself.1 68 Thus, in the classic example, "damages arising from the
condemnation of a sliver of property for a new road are offset by the
enhanced value of the owner's remaining property as a result of the
road." 69 Similarly, the Supreme Court has hinted that certain rights created
by the government concomitant with the alleged taking-such as
transferable development rights ("TDRs") in the land use context-might
also qualify as a form of just compensation that can reduce or eliminate the
need for monetary payment.o70
Applying these decisions to the public pension context, the question
is whether a government can build into a pension reform some type of
compensating benefit for the participants. One interesting proposal along
these lines recently appeared in the Cardozo Law Review. In a student note,
Adam Riff recommends that state and local governments employ the
Takings Clause as a reform mechanism itself, affirmatively condemning
their employees' public pension benefits.' 7 ' With regard to the just
compensation requirement, Riff further recommends that a governmental
unit adopting this approach: (1) fulfill its current pension obligations as to
any benefits already earned by participants as of the date of the
167. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Co., 419 U.S. 102, 151 (1974).
168. See, e.g., id.; Baumanv. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). Whether such benefits
need be "special" to the property owner, or whether "general" benefits flowing to larger
portions of the community may also be included, remains unclear. Compare, e.g., Home v.
Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) (hinting that general regulatory benefits
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Nonetheless, the majority made clear its view that the TDRs "undoubtedly mitigate whatever
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condemnation; and (2) "establish a new retirement plan with value on the
market that will benefit current workers on services performed going
forward, such as a 40 1(k)."l72 The establishment of an alternative retirement
plan, Riff argues, could be analogized to "special benefits" or TDRs that
reduce or satisfy any just compensation owed for the taking.1 7 3
To see why, it is necessary to take a brief tangent into the world of
retirement plan composition. Most government retirement plans are
structured as defined benefit systems, 74 meaning that participants receive a
fixed benefit upon retirement calculated with regard to their respective
ages, salaries, and lengths of employment.' 75 These benefits are typically
funded by contributions into an investment pool controlled by the
employer, who also bears the risks of underfunding because it must pay the
benefits at the set amount regardless of shortfalls in the pool.1 76 By contrast,
the 401(k) plans used by most private employers are defined contribution
systems, which typically fund retirement benefits through some
combination of employer and employee contributions to individual
employee savings accounts.' 77 In these plans, the employers' obligation is
simply to contribute at the promised level, not to guarantee any specific
return or entitlement to the account holder.17 Thus the participants
themselves bear the ultimate risk 79 but also enjoy certain advantages not
found in most defined benefit plans-e.g., more liberal vesting rules,
increased portability, and greater control over the amount of their own
contributions and choices of investments. 80
Because defined contribution plans do not place the employer at
risk for unfunded future liabilities, over time they would be less costly for
the government and the taxpayers. At the same time, defined contribution
plans would provide benefits to plan participants not enjoyed under the
current retirement structures. In effect, Riff's proposal calls for government
employers to use the savings occasioned by the taking of participant rights
in a defined benefit plan to pay for the creation of other participant rights in
172. Id. at 350.
173. Id. at 338-40. Other scholars have made similar recommendations-i.e., that state
and local governments begin offering defined contribution plans-although not in the
context of satisfying the just compensation requirement. See, e.g., Karen Ellers Lahey & T.
Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is Necessary to Save the Retirement
ofState Employees, 21 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 307, 322-28 (2007).
174. See Anenson et al., supra note 4, at 6.
175. See Buck, supra note 4, at 33-34; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution
Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004).
176. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die ... And How They
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 785 (2014).
177. Id. at 784; Zelinsky, supra note 175, at 455.
178. Zelinsky, supra note 175, at 455.
179. Chung, supra note 176, at 784-85.
180. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 173, at 323-24 (discussing advantages of
defined contribution plans).
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a defined contribution plan.' And the value of these latter rights, he
argues, should be included in any just compensation awarded to the plan
participants for the taking of the former rights.18 2
Riff's overall proposal, of course, envisions direct takings pursued
by the government. But the ideas about compensation, if workable, should
apply equally to takings challenges advanced by plan participants. Indeed,
on the surface anyway, the argument has an intuitive attraction. Finding a
way to compensate plan participants while simultaneously reducing the
government's overall pension liabilities would seemingly be a desirable
outcome to any takings problem. Moreover, to the extent that the
government provides real and valuable benefits in exchange for the
property it takes, those benefits should be credited toward the satisfaction of
any compensation the government otherwise owes. Given the lack of
specific precedent and the general disorder of takings doctrine, however,
whether courts ultimately agree with these propositions is anyone's guess.
CONCLUSION
The fiscal conditions relating to their pension systems pose unique
problems for the strength and wellbeing of municipal governments in the
first part of the twenty-first century. As recent litigation has demonstrated,
effectively addressing those problems requires consideration of the
constitutional protections afforded to plan participants. Among those
protections, the Takings Clause has largely received a sort of subordinate
status, taking a back seat to the Contracts Clause in much of the case law
and scholarly commentary.
Properly considered, however, the Takings Clause forms an
important component of the public pension reform conversation. In states
that reject the contract view of public pensions, the Takings Clause presents
the most viable constitutional claim for plan participants seeking to
challenge reform efforts. Moreover, the analytical distinctions between
claims advanced under the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause may
make takings challenges attractive even in states that adopt the contract
view.
For these reasons, the Takings Clause and challenges brought under
it should receive more serious engagement than they have heretofore
garnered. A full evaluation of takings challenges requires fitting public
pension reform within the Supreme Court's framework for determining
when legislative or regulatory action qualifies as a taking. Additionally,
difficult questions exist with regard to the proper measure of compensation
owed to plan participants once a taking is found. This Article highlights
some of the leading arguments with which judges and litigants must deal,
181. See Riff, supra note 141, at 338 ("[T]he government could use the condemned
property to establish a defined contribution plan that benefits workers going forward.").
182. Id. at 338-40.
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with the hope that full development of these issues will be advanced by
courts and commentators in the future.
